Abstract!
The paper studies the divergent theories of choice spawned within the larger question of freedom in J.P. Sartre's Being and Nothingness as well as the Critique de la raison dialectique and P. Ricoeur's Freedom and Nature:
The Voluntary and the Involuntary.
All the key features of Sartre's and Ricoeur's theories of choice are reviewed while accounting for their similarities and differences.
It is argued that Sartre's theory is best understood if distinctions are made between ontological freedom, freedom of choice, and freedom of execution.
In the light of Ricoeur's position, Sartre's description of choice is shown to be phenomenologically inaccurate while his theory of motivation emerges as one sided in that it submerges all the receptive or involuntary aspects of choice in the act of resolution.
The sources of Sartre's voluntaristic one-sidedness are traced to his premature leap into ontology, to his existential naivete in seeking direct description of m a n 's prereflexive experience, and to his rejection of the results of empirical investigations of man.
The conclusion argues for the superiority of Ricoeur's position over both the determinists' interpretations of choice and Sartre's voluntaristic existential interpretation.
Sartre and Ricoeur on Freedom and Choice
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre asserts that "Man cannot be sometimes free: he is wholly and forever free or he is not free at all."-*-Given this radical conception of freedom, choice is described as beyond motives, causes, passions and deliberations.2 Choice is a wholly creative upsurge of a free self.
In Freedom and Nature:
The Voluntary and the Involuntary, Ricoeur claims that "Freedom is not a pure act, it is, in each of its moments, activity and receptivity. It constitutes itself in receiving what it does not produce: values, capacities, and sheer nature."3 For Ricoeur choice involves a reciprocity of the voluntary and involuntary.
The implications of these fundamental disagreements about freedom and choice are predictably extensive.
The principal objective of this paper is to study the divergent theories of choice and motivation spawned within the larger question of freedom in the works of Sartre and Ricoeur. While there are numerous and striking differences between the two positions, equally striking and fundamental points of agreement are obvious: both philosophies are antideterministic, both are phenomenologically oriented, both consider choice to be an essential human activity.
Yet they disagree strongly in their ultimate conceptions of freedom, in their understanding of the process of choice and in the roles of motives, reasons, values, facticity and ends in relation to choice. Sartre, J.P., Being and Nothingness, tr. Hazel Barnes, N.Y., Washington Square Press, (1969) , p. 569.
My purposes then are to provide a condensed rendition of all the major features of Sartre's and Ricoeur's theories of choice, while accounting for their similarities and differences, and to examine Ricoeur's critique of the ontology, theory of choice and methodology of Sartre.
Sartre on Choice
The basic tenor of Sartre's view is that man is either totally free or not free at all.
The import of this claim must be examined at the three levels of ontological freedom, of freedom of choice and of freedom of execution.
Failure to attend to these distinctions has often led to confusion in the interpretation of Sartrian freedom.
Ontological Freedom:
Sartre's ontological description of man as free is well known and need only be outlined here.
In the Transcendence of the Ego^, he argued against Husserl's transcendental ego as part of the original structure of consciousness. For Sartre the ego only arises secondarily in reflexive consciousness.
Prereflexively, there is no ego. For example, when I am counting, consciousness is only aware that counting is going on.
It is only when consciousness turns back upon itself reflexively that awareness of an "I" or ego as counting arises.
The reason for his denial of the Husserlian transcendental ego is that an identical ego in the flux of consciousness would, in Sartre's view, introduce a divisive principle, an opacity at the heart of consciousness whereas he wishes to argue that consciousness is completely transparent -that its sole function is to be consciousness of... This understanding of consciousness is further elaborated at the beginning of Being and Nothingness (BN) and results in the identification of consciousness with nothingness and freedom.
Consciousness is always conscious of something or intentional.
Sartre interprets intentionality in a manner opposed to Husserl's idealism wherein the object intended is constituted by consciousness.
For Sartre, the referent of intention is independent of consciousness.
This referent is Sartre, J.P., The Transcendence of the E g o , tr. Williams and Kirkpatrick, N . Y . , Noonday Press, (1966) .
the in-itself which is a being and consciousness is the foritself which is not a self, nor a substance but only the revelation of the in-itself.
The in-itself is described as solid, dense, full being bereft of any consciousness or freedom.
The in-itself is fixed and determined, in principle subject to causal laws. It does not have any hidden powers, potentialities, possibilities or freedom:
it just is what it is.
The for-itself, on the contrary, is a translucent consciousness.
The for-itself is transcendent that is, it intends that which is not itself and it bursts through temporal dimensions for it can project into the future and recapture the past.
Consciousness affords the for-itself the unique possibility of asking questions and this experience is the guiding thread of Sartre's analysis of man.
We need not repeat here the lengthy argument5 whereby Sartre accomplishes a regressive analysis of the question, the uncovering of non-being as an ontological factor of the for-itself's experience, the search for the origin of nonbeing and the conclusion that man must be a being who bears nothingness within himself like "a worm coiled at its heart''. The nothingness which man "secretes" is not merely something experienced, it is inherent in the structure of consciousness itself.
In virtue of this man is a nihilating being.
What does this ability to nihilate mean for man? It enables him to cut himself off from the present, to withdraw into the past, to project himself into the future, to disengage himself from the world of objects, in other words, to be free.
Man can withdraw from anything which might determine him by "inserting a wedge of nothingness" between himself and all else.
Sartre's notion of freedom follows upon his analysis of consciousness which is a paradoxical combination of being and nothingness.
It is in virtue of nothingness that man is free.
For Sartre, freedom, consciousness, the power of nihilation are all equivalent terms.
Freedom of Choice:
Sartre's theory of consciousness as a power of nihilation and a possibility of positing that which is not yet is at the root of his extremely voluntaristic theory of choice. The first implication of man's ontological freedom is that choice is inevitable: man is condemned to choose. As a free being who is what he is not and is not what he is, man, from the moment he exists, must make himself be whatever he chooses. Even a refusal to choose is in effect a choice of one way among others of being.
Freedom of choice follows necessarily from ontological freedom. However, it is not to be identified with freedom of execution. Sartrian man is "finite not infinite, human not divine. Man is neither the foundation of his freedom nor the foundation of the world. He is thrown into an already constituted world. In other words, human freedom is situated and man does not have the power to transform the world into whatever he wishes.Freedom of choice is the unlimited ability to assign meanings and is not to be confused with the power to do whatever one wishes.
If this distinction is not taken seriously, one ends up with the absurd view that Sartre is attributing to man unlimited power of doing coextensive with his unlimited power of choice. This ignores what Sartre repeatedly says about freedom in situation which will be dealt with below.
On the other hand, the distinction can wrongly be used to trivialize Sartre on the grounds that freedom to choose meanings is insignificant next to the freedom to do what one wants. The crucial relations between different senses of freedom can be developed through a situation which is apt for the purpose though not intended originally to illustrate a philosophical point. Mendês-France describing his experiences in a prisoner of war camp writes:
All the prisoners dreamt of escape during every single night of their confinement.
For some it is a beautiful, vague and distant project which they know they would never try to carry out. For others, it is an unforeseen eventuality, an occasion for which they are waiting without going out of their way to bring it about. For others again, it is a set decision, an appointment with adventure, with its vistas of freedom and its dangers.
I do not believe there is such a thing as a chance escape. A prisoner who finds himself one day in an unforeseen situation, containing a possibility of escape will avail of it only if he has already chosen once for all, in his deepest being, to reclaim his Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p.p. 707 -711.
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freedom.
An escape can sometimes be materially improvised, it is never improvised psychologically.7
All the men in the example are in essentially similar situations, yet their behaviour varies widely.
Some are passive, some are ambiguous and some are aggressive in the face of the question of escape.
How would Sartre account for their varying expressions of freedom?
In the first place, there can be no action without freedom because "an action is on principle intentional11" that is, aim directed or project oriented.
Thus the prisoner who is forced to join a group of escapees has not acted while those who plot have acted though both carry out the same deed.
To form a project to escape requires the apprehension of an objective lack, in this case, the kind of life which is denied by confinement, and that requires a nihilating act of consciousness.
This permanent possibility which consciousness has of tearing itself away from being toward that which is not yet but could be, is ontological freedom.
This first condition is not alone sufficient for action. Surely all the prisoners, even those who passively obey their captors apprehend a lack in their state of life.
The difference in conduct between the escapees and the obedient ones is not a difference in their objective situations but in the meaning they assign to it. For Sartre, the objective facts are neutral, merely open to being constituted in one way or another.
Choice is not only a freedom to choose a conduct but a freedom to choose a motive.
Thus some prisoners will constitute the deprivations of prison life as unbearable and as a motive to escape in spite of the threat of severe punishment while others will constitute the threat of punishment as a motive to obey and accept the deprivations. In either case the facts do not determine choice or motive. This illustrates Sartre's anti-deterministic argument: " 
562.
On this basis, Sartre argues that while every act has a motive, a motive cannot cause an act.
In the physical world which is the model of the determinist, a cause produces an effect such that given the cause, the effect is predictable. Human choice involves a relation of motive to action which is radically unlike the cause-effect relation in the physical world.
The motive does not exist prior to the choice which confers value upon it as a motive.
It is only nihilating consciousness which can make something a motive for an action which is to realize a future (non-existent) possibility. "Causes and motives have meaning only inside a projected ensemble which is precisely an ensemble of non-existents. And this ensemble is ultimately myself as transcendence... It is the act which decides its ends and its motives, and the act is the expression of freedom."10 Determinism fails to account properly for human motivation because it insists on describing motives on the model of things.
Determinism seeks to establish an unbroken continuity between the motive taken as a psychic given and the act taken as the effect of a cause, such that "...ends ready-made and pre-human will...define the meaning of my act even before I conceive it, just as causes as pure psychic givens will produce it without my even being aware of them."11 Thus whatever the prisoners did would be explained as a function of the most powerful internal and/or external force to which consciousness would necessarily succumb.
By contrast, Sartre's conception of man as free, as founded by nothingness, as separated from what he is by what he will be, implies that each man must make himself -"for human reality, to be is to choose oneself; nothing comes to it either from the outside or from within which it can receive or accept."12 Man must make himself down to the slightest detail. In Sartre's extreme position there is no room for the slightest determinism:
Man "is wholly and forever free or he is not free at all."13 There is no reciprocity of active and receptive dimensions of choice for nothing can impinge upon a nihilating consciousness:
"it is impossible for a determined process to act upon a spontaneity, exactly as it is impossible for objects to act on consciousness."14 This is the basic argument which Sartre uses over and over to eliminate all receptivity in choice and thereby reinforce the radical creativity and autonomy of choice. Since this argument runs counter to the common sense feeling that we are hemmed in on all sides by incoercibles and counter to theories which seek to define areas of degrees of free choice as well as deterministic theories, Sartre is at pains to reply to the host of ready objections which can be raised against his voluntaristic position.
Using variations of the preceding argument, he proceeds to a progressive elimination of all the so-called determinants of choice which could in any way limit freedom to choose.
Choice itself constitutes the limits of human projects: When in the face of a threat to his life, a prisoner grovels in passionate fear, this is an expression of his choice not an instance of being overwhelmed by a passion which supposedly invades him.
He chooses the situation as passionately fearsome. This is just as much of a choice through less reflective, as the calm, deliberate decision to plot an escape.
Fear is as free as courage -both are chosen ways of relating to a chosen way of being in the world.
Concrete choices reflect the ends implicit in the original project which ends are not received from outside (no object can act on nihilating consciousness) or from within (there is no inner nature).
It is the free subject who gives sense and meaning to things.
Both the motive (objective fact such as a threat) and the mobile (subjective fact such as fear or courage) are significant only as constituted by choice and have no determining efficacy on their own.
Similarly the act of choice of each inmate is not determined by deliberation.
Since all of the factors which enter into deliberative process have the weight and meaning which the cogitator freely assigns to them, deliberation conceived as a way of arriving at a decision is only a pretence.
Deliberation is only a chosen means of expressing what is already decided.
"When I deliberate, the chips are down.
When the will intervenes, the decision is taken and it has no other value than that of making the announcement. All acts are free. The structure of a voluntary act requires the deliberate apprehension of a motive as a quasiobject held In suspense.
The voluntary actor, such as the plotting prisoner, chooses himself as one who is explicitly aware of his ends and motives.
However, the unreflective prisoner who takes advantage of an unforeseen opportunity is no less a choice maker.
The difference is that the former explicitly attends to his concrete choices while the latter does not. "...will is not a privileged manifestation of freedom but it is a psychic event of a peculiar structure which is constituted on the same plane as other psychic events and which is supported, neither more nor legs than the others, by an original, ontological freedom.*'16
Choice is also beyond the past.
We have the impression of being bound by motives adopted in the past.
While there is no denying that the past haunts present consciousness and that it is tempting to repeat past choices, the past has the same status as any object:
It is an in-itself which can be nihilated.
If a past motive is to bear upon a new choice it can do so, not of itself, but only insofar as a new choice gives it value:
"Yet if the motive is transcendent, if it is only the irremediable being which we have to be in the mode of the 'was', if like all our past it is separated from us by a breadth of nothingness, then it can act on us only if it is recovered; in itself it is without force."17
The preceding description of choice creates the impression that all choices are gratuitous, atomic, capricous, absurd. Sartre's response is that each of my acts, even the most insignificant, implies a whole "Weltanschaung" or what Sartre calls an original project.
This project is my fundamental choice of a way of being in the world.
Each act is not simply the effect of a prior psychic state but "rather is integrated as a secondary structure in global structures and finally in the totality which I am."l° Each act is a manifestation of the original project and is understandable in terms of it, either by a regressive analysis from the particular act to the ultimate project or in the opposite direction by a synthetic progression. 
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The original project is not distinct from my being "it is a choice of myself in the world and by the same token it is a discovery of the world. "-*-9 The original choice is not deliberate because it is the foundation of all deliberations That is to say, what shall count as a motive or reason depends upon the original project.
Nor is it unconscious for it is one with the consciousness we have of ourselves. "And, as our being is precisely our original choice, the consciousness (of) choice is identical with the selfconsciousness which we have.
One must be conscious in order to choose, and one must choose in order to be conscious.
Choice and consciousness are one and the same thing."20
Freedom of Execution:
Unlike freedom of choice, freedom of execution is limited To fail to see this is to attribute to Sartre a vision of the most absurd unrealism.
The human situation is riddled with constraints to action.
Man is thrown into a world which presents itself as a given which cannot be subjectively transformed. Consciousness' function is to reveal the in-itself but it is not the maker of the in-itself.
There is a datum, a set of givens which face freedom and which Sartre collectively calls facticity.
How can freedom be total in the face of the irrepressible facticity of the world?
Facticity includes my place, my past, my surroundings, my fellow bretheren, my death.
Sartre does not deny these brute facts but he does deny that they limit my freedom. How does he do this?
In the first place, he points out that the brute facts are indispensable to freedom.21 Without them there would not be anything upon which to exercise freedom of choice. If our every wish were realized by merely wishing, then freedom would be meaningless.
Without obstacles there can be no meaning to freedom any more than one can escape from a prison in which one is not confined.
In order to act freely there must be something to oppose or with which to act in harmony.
This is basically what Sartre means when he says freedom is situated.
But the point is only fully developed in the Critique de la raison dialectique■ It is clear from this that Sartre is speaking of the freedom appropriate to a finite human being and that the sense of freedom which is at stake is freedom of choice not freedom of execution.
Freedom is the ability to choose and it does not in any way depend upon successful results.22
In the second place, he goes on to show that the brute facts are not in themselves limitations of freedom. In themselves they are neutral: they become difficulties or facilities for us only in relation to our own choices.
It is on this basis that Sartre preserves the thesis that freedom of choice has no limits.
To illustrate: Suppose a prisoner is so maltreated as to lose the use of his hands permanently.
While he is not free to change the fact, he remains free to decide how to live his life as a cripple. He can allow his plight to pull him down in despair and self-pity or he can accept it as an invitation to courageous defiance.
The facts are neutral but one is free to give them their meaning. In this sense freedom of choice is unlimited while freedom of execution is constrained.
The presence of other freedoms also imposes constraints upon freedom.
These are unavoidable since each for-itself has the ultimate goal of totalizing its freedom. This necessary ontological pursuit is constantly frustrated by the Other: the experience of shame described in the famous example of the man at the keyhole23 reveals not only the existence of the Other but his power to intrude upon my world, "the appearance of the Other in the world corresponds therefore to a fixed sliding of the whole universe, to a decentralization of the world which undermines the centralization which I am simultaneously effecting."24 The very recognition of self depends on the Other: Daniel in the Reprieve admits "I then understood that one could not reach oneself except through another's judgment, another's hatred.
And also through another's love perhaps"25 in BN the circle of love, masochism, sadism, and hate^o describes the impossibility of reconciling freedoms for each for-itself is irreducibly a free subject seeking futilely to Critics have varied widely in their interpretations of the relationship between the Sartre's two major philosophical works.
On one plane the dispute is about whether or not Sartre has abandoned Existentialism to embrace a revised Marxism.
This issue will be set aside in favour of the closely related but more pertinent controversy about the theory of freedom in the two works.
Warnock^O and Odajnyk^l argue that the man of absolute freedom in BN has been completely swallowed up in the dialectic of social and historical relations in CRD. D e s a n^ and Anzieu^o while not so extreme, see a considerable evolution in the direction of a freedom much more constrained While this complex issue cannot be treated in detail here, a sketch sufficient to indicate the reasons for opting in favour of continuity in Sartre's thoughts about freedom must be offered.
Initially, a consideration of key concepts such as seriality, the collective, the group-in-fusion and the institution as described in CRD seems to support the impression that Sartre has abandoned the theory of absolute human freedom.
The case of people queuing up at a bus stop is an example of the serial relation.
This group is a plurality of solitudes related to each other through the mediation of a common interest.
Each potential bus passenger is a mere object whose position in the group is determined by the number of the ticket held.
Once freely committed to taking the bus, each person is entangled in a web of necessitythe necessity of waiting, of standing in line in a certain order, of being dependent upon the bus which he cannot control.
"Serial unity as a common interest, imposes itself as exigency and destroys all opposition."3° Similarly, necessity characterizes the class as a collective.
A class group such as 'the workers' becomes "a material thing made up of men insofar as it constitutes itself as a negation of man and as a serial impossibility of negating this negation ...Each worker feels himself confirmed in his inertia by the inertia of all others..."39 3 4 3 5 * 3 7 * 3 9 34 Sheridan, James, Sartre: The Radical Conversion, Athens, Ohio:
Ohio University Press, 
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The group-in-fusion exemplified by the Parisians who, in 1789 stormed the Bastille, seems to transcend the unfreedom of the serial groups.
When, spurred by a common threat their "freedom escapes from alienation and affirms itself as the common efficacy."^0 Yet this victory is immediately threatened by the tendency of the group to dissolve once the task is completed.
Hence it must, to keep its members unified, impose inertia upon itself by means of an oath. This in turn opens the way to the reign of Terror which maintains the members of the group in self-imposed bondage to each other.
Finally, all groups tend to solidify into institutions and "the institutional system, including the coercion which maintains it, depends on the originary and reciprocal impotence of each third confronting each other and through his relations all others."^1
The descriptions of CRD abound in such references to inertia, impotence and necessity inherent in the dialectics of social relations.
Commentators who have stressed these aspects while neglecting the full dialectical interplay of necessity and freedom, have been led to the false conclusion that freedom in CRD has been negated.
The opposite conclusion emerges if due consideration is given to the dialectical complexity of Sartre's reasoning and if one inquires into the role in CRD of the main features of the theory in BN such as consciousness as negativity, the primacy of the individual, the distinctions between ontological freedom, freedom of choice and freedom of execution as well as the meaning of situatedness.
The view of consciousness as a power of nihilation is nowhere denied in CRD.
Man remains the isolated individual whose uniqueness lies in his ability to transcend the givens, to make projects: "Thus man defines himself by his project. This material being perpetually transcends the condition which is made for him; he reveals and determines his situation in transcending it to externalize himself, by work, by action or by significations.... our needs, like our passions or like the most abstract of our thoughts participate in this structure: they are always out there, of themselves toward...... "^2 Thus ontological freedom which is none other than the transcendence of consciousness, remains as the keystone of the Sartrian view of man in CRD.
Sartre, Critique, p. 425.
Sartre, Critique, p.p. 583-584.
Sartre, Critique, p. 95* The individual retains his primacy in the Critique for after all is said and done Sartre's social groups are a plurality of juxtaposed individuals all Of whom are equal in being free.
Even in the case of the potent group-in-fusion, it is the individual who makes the totality through his praxis. "The intelligibility of the group-in-fusion-thus rests on the complex unity of a negative designation of its commonality reactualized in the negation of this negation, that is to say, in the free constitution of individual praxis in common praxis."43 Further, "common action, at the elementary level, does not present any essential differences from individual action except in its results which are obviously more complex. ..
In spite of the numerous constraints imposed by social relations in CRD, Sartre's position on the issue of freedom of choice is essentially the same as in BN.
The descriptions of social relations in CRD only make concrete what Sartre has stated on a more speculative plane in BN about 'coefficients of adversity' and 'freedom in situation'. As in BN, all the inertia, alienation and conflict do not prevent men from going beyond the factual aspects of existence, by means of the power of nihilation.
Furthermore, as in BN, all the constraints upon freedom arise from the clash of one freedom with that of the other, for all men are fundamentally equal.
"In the other who acts with me, my freedom cannot but recognize itself as the same, that is, as singularity and ubiquity."45 This inalienable equality of freedoms is the basis of the huge adversities created by social existence.
As Sartre indicated in his earlier work, the freedom of the Other inevitably conflicts with my freédom.
In CRD the same point is often made but nowhere is it clearer than in the summation of what accounts for the intransigencies spawned by history.
"If history escapes me it is not because I do not make it but because the Other is making it also.
Materiality in CRD is understood in a way similar to the view Sartre has about facticity in BN: Materiality is not a limit to freedom but a neutral given which is a necessary concomitant to freedom.
Whether it appears as adversity or facility, depends on some human project.
" 
427.
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in human experience when matter worked upon steals our action from us not insofar as it is pure materiality but insofar as it is praxis materialized."^7 Once the free act of man endows matter with meaning, it has the power to strike back at him but this power is a power of human choice mediated by matter. Thus the computer made by man can also enslave him.
By showing that all the limitations experienced by man do not result from any natural objective state of affairs but rather from human projects in a world where there are Others, Sartre maintains the thesis of BN that "no limits to my freedom can be found except freedom itself..."^"
Commentators who claim that a second Sartre emerges in CRD also forget that in BN success is not important to freedom. Freedom of execution is severely handicapped by the fact that man is thrown into a world which already has a structure, that he is not the source of his own being, that his ultimate project of being-in-itself-for-itself is impossible, etc. In both works alienation, failure, adversity, are everywhere. CRD adds a realism to the abstract discussion of freedom in BN by its brilliant elaborations of the dialectical interplay of human freedom with the social, economic and historical factors of m a n 's experience.
There can no longer be any hesitation about what it means for the for-itself to be situated.
And being situated is shown in both works to be compatible with inalienable ontological freedom and absolute freedom of choice.
"Thus I am absolutely free and absolutely responsible for my situation.
But I am never free except in situation."^9
Ricoeur on Freedom and Choice
Ricoeur's description of choice is conducted within phenomenological brackets which suspend both the naturalistic and objectivistic attitudes.
In addition, he employs, in his search for the essence of decision, eidetic brackets which suspend concrete existential features of any given choice. The Ricoeurian analysis is an intentional one which begins with the object-correlate of choosing consciousness, the project.
Then a reflective turn to the subject as the one who decides is made. These two voluntary dimensions are then related to the involuntary of motivation. 
623.
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At the end of the first chapter of Freedom and N a t u r e , Ricoeur offers the following tripartite phenomenological description:
"To decide means first of all to project a practical possibility of an action which depends on me, secondly to impute myself as the author responsible for the project, and finally to motivate my project by reasons and variables which 'historialize' values capable of justifying them."50 Choice and Project:
In choice, the self is turned toward a project.
The type of intention involved is one which "designates in general, a future action which depends on me and which is within my power."51 Designating in general is a bare intention such as to escape from prison52 without the concrete fullness of a plan for realizing the empty intention.
An image of what is to be done is not essential.
A choice involves a categorical designation and personal action, typified by the plotting prisoners. This distinguishes it from wish which is not a categorical "so be it" but an expression of hope which depends on the course of things or actions of others, as in the case of those who merely dream of escape, and, from a command which though categorical depends on someone other than me to be carried out.
The future temporality of the project is its most distinctive feature.
To project is to decide for a time to come.
This future is only intended thus it does not have the continuity and irreversibility of the experienced order. A kind of circle is involved in future temporality.
As a captive, I seek to constitute a future of the project of escape yet the future is not really mine to constitute. Hence the "future is the condition of an action, but it is not an action."53 The future temporality of consciousness cannot therefore be conceived solely as an ability to make proj ect s .
Finally the project involves a sense of power or capability.
Ricoeur approaches the topic in terms of possibility.
In one sense possibility is what the order of Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, P-84.
Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, P* 43.
52 To facilitate comparison between Sartre and Ricoeur, the prisoner example will also be used here. 53 Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, p. 52.
things permits i.e. there is the possibility of stealing an enemy vehicle to flee because there are vehicles in the prison compound. In a second sense, possibility is the purely potential designation of the action which is to be done.
If this possibility is not to devolve into mere wish then "what I project is possible only when there is a sense of capability of power...added to the project."54 These two senses of possibility must be harmonized in action.
When I steal the truck, I join up possibility opened up by my project with possibility afforded by the enemy transport.
A third sense of possibility is that of the subject who does the action for in doing something I am making myself be, or realizing my possibles.
Choice and the Self:
In making a choice, the choosing self is simultaneously designated.
The most obvious instance of awareness of being the author of my acts arises when, in the face of other people, I am forced to acknowledge my responsibility for my acts, as when I proclaim myself as "leader of this breakout". The feeling of responsibility reveals to me that "I have no means of self-affirmation other than my acts themselves. I am only an aspect of my acts, the subject pole of my acts."55 Not all choices involve an explicit awareness of the self's presence to its acts.
In most acts the project to be done consumes attention and there is only a pre-reflexive self-imputation.
The self's involvement is not always conscious but since I am my acts, there is always a pre-reflexive imputation of myself in each of my projects. Self consciousness is possible only because there is reflexive consciousness which can be made thematic.
On this background, the self as a possibility in relation to choice can be described.
The first sense in which the self is a possibility is revealed by the fact that I select a way of being what I am for I propose a conduct for my body to follow.
Thus I am possible in relation to my body's future reality.
In a second sense, each choice opens up some avenues and closes others and therefore defines an area of future possibilities. 54 Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, P-54. 55 Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, P. 57.
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Choice and Motivation:
At this point the involuntary dimension of choice is confronted.
Description so far gives the impression that choice is a totally voluntary activity.
But motivation prevents decision from being a free floating act.
Ricoeur avoids a deterministic pitfall when he distinguishes between motive and cause.
The relationship of motive to decision differs radically from the relationship at the level of things between cause and effect.
Drawing heavily from the work of Pfänder, an early phenomenologist, Ricoeur contrasts motive and cause directly It is the nature of a cause to be knowable and understood prior to its effects....cause confers its meaning on the effect: understanding proceeds irreversibly from cause to effect.
On the other hand, it is the essence of a motive not tb have a complete meaning apart from the decision which refers to it. I am not able to understand the motives first and in themselves, deriving an understanding of the decision secondarily from them....the motive cannot serve as the basis for a decision unless a will bases itself on it.
It determines the will only as the will determines itself.56
Ricoeur emphasizes the reciprocity between motive and choice.
Motives are received but they also stimulate and the self must actively determine itself at the same time as it bases itself on the received motives in order to decide or project.
The necessity of the reciprocity of project, selfdetermination of the ego and motive emerges when we consider projects where the reciprocities are defective.
In the anxious captive, the inability to engage himself in a project tires out his capacity for self-determination and leaves it suspended in a do-nothing stance.
Selfdetermination severed from motives yields arbitrary acts, viz. the frustrated man unable to connect his desire to flee with the realities of the situation, may charge the gate in wild self-assertion and be shot for his efforts.
Failure of self-determination to base itself by choosing a motive results in a scruple or persistent hesitation, as with the prisoner who can neither commit himself to run nor accept his status as a prisoner.
Thus the voluntary of choice is 56 Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, p. 6 7 .
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73 not abrogated by the involuntary of motives.
They complement each other.
Failure to recognize the reciprocity of the voluntary and the involuntary distorts the under standing of choice.
The determinist, by identifying motive and cause must ultimately deny freedom.
The extreme libertarian such as Sartre, makes the act of choice everything and fails to recognize receptivity of choice and the motive as a necessary constitutent of choice.
Choice and the Body:
The body as a source of vital values is another involuntary factor.
The relation between body and choice is analogous to that between motive and project.
"The circular relation of motive to project demands that I recognize my body as body-for-my-willing, and my willing as projectbased-(in part)-on-my-body."57
The relation can be illustrated through need.
Hunger, for example, is involuntary (I cannot help feeling hunger) but it is subject to some determination by the Cogito (I can refuse to eat).
Need is not a mechanical reflex and is therefore partially open to free choice which can decline to satisfy or at least postpone a response to a need.
Need is essentially a consciousness of a lack of...and its intentional character is what permits it to become a motive which inclines without compelling: a hunger strike is possible despite the body's demand for gratification.
Needs are motives among others.
As a spontaneity of the body, need presents me with values before I will them: "Through need, values emerge without my having posited them in my act-generating role:
Bread is good, wine is good. Before I will i t , a value already appeals to me solely because I exist in the flesh; it is already...a reality which reveals itself to me through lack."5°A longside bodily needs, can be included the pleasurable and the painful, the easy and the difficult, which do not constitute a system because of their heterogeneity. They are involuntary but relatively so, for they are partially subject to free acts of will.
The involuntary domain of motivation extends beyond organic factors and includes social backgrounds and value systems within which individuals are immersed.
My social and historical situation presents me 57 Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, P.P-85-86 58 Ricoeur, Freedom and Nabure, P. 94.
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with spontaneous values just as my body does.
However, in all these cases, it is up to the will to evaluate, compare, and choose whether to accept or refuse the received values.
The involuntary of the organic, social and historical contexts generate ambiguities and affective confusions which are principles of hesitation.
Hesitation:
The interrelation of the voluntary and involuntary is made concrete in the process from hesitation to choice. The description to this point was conducted within eidetic brackets and choice was considered as a frozen instantaneous moment carved out of the temporal flux.
But choice has a history which must be recaptured beyond eidetics though under the sign of eidetics.
That is, the temporal process of choice will be elucidated in the light of the essential structures established in pure description for they are operative in the history of choice.
Choice cannot be reduced to the final fiat for it has a history.
Hesitation while it falls short of choice is an attempt at choosing.
In hesitation, I am a perplexed willing seeking to orient itself among possibilities.
Each of the elements of choice presents a multiplicity of possibilities and confusions which produce hesitation: What project shall be chosen? What kind of self am I to become through my acts? Which motives shall be accepted? Each bodily need, each desire is open to interpretation. The circumstances in which the act is to be carried out are never exactly known.
Organic values offer no definite hierarchy.
The social history of each individual includes layers of historically conditioned and often conflicting values.
Each individual is involved in a plurality of roles which may imply competing demands.
And finally there are conflicts between ends and means.
Because of factors such as these, choice must be realized in a confusing temporal duration.
However, if choices are ever to be made, the debate must be stopped at some point.
The "power of stopping the debate is no other than the power of conducting it and.T.(the)... control over the succession is attention."59 The mix of voluntary and involuntary aspects of attention appear clearly in Ricoeur's claim that attention is an active process of making objects of consciousness stand out against the 59 Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, p. 149. muddle of hesitations but that the "standing out" sought is maximally receptive of the selected objects as they are.
Choice and Deliberation:
The root of hesitation is the passivity of corporeal existence which makes possible the indefiniteness of project, self and motives.
Deliberation is needed to clarify the possibilities over time by the free vision of attention which is an activity.
Thus the involuntary of corporeal indefiniteness is accompanied by the voluntary of attentive inquiry.
Dispelling hesitation involves an attentive disentangling of values and a gradual unification of tentative values to form a self-affirming idea.
A number of attempts at separating confused elements to subsequently develop a unified idea may be necessary.
The free act of attention even if performed in the context of the involuntary of motives is what makes a choice free. When this is recognized the dilemma of rationalism and irrationalism is overcome.
The rationalists falsely assert that the only free choice is one based on clear rational motives arrived at by way of deductive or dialectical logical models.
However, if attention, which raises motives to clarity and distinction is the locus of freedom, then deliberation conducted with attention is free whether that deliberation is about logical ideas or about feelings.
The Event of Choice:
In relation to the process of coming to a decision, choice involves both a continuity insofar as it completes the process and a discontinuity in the sense that it inaugurates the project as a simple intention of future action.
The novelty which arises in choice is the active reverse of attention as the receptive aspect of freedom.
Choice has a receptive dimension insofar as it issues from previous deliberation and is its terminal point.
Choice has an active dimension in that is a breaking away from the alternatives in which hesitating consciousness is suspended and is thereby a freeing which allows a movement toward the act which is the preferred alternative.
Thus, "the movement and the resolution are two sides of one and the same temporal freedom of attention which can consider this or that, or can stop considering and elect.
60 Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, p 167.
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Philosophies which fail to recognize that choice involves both a continuity and a discontinuity produce one-sided readings of the event of choice.
The intellectualiste tradition identifies choice with the cessation of deliberation and counts the resolution of motivation for nothing.
Thus for the intellectualist the choice to flee is identical with "seeing" that the weight of reasons in favour of so doing is greater than the weight of reasons against doing so. In other words, this tradition overlooks the fact that choice is an act.distinct from deliberation.
The difficulties with the intellectualiste position emerge in the light of Ricoeur*s theory of attention.
In the first place, thinking is an act which is not reducible to a linking of the contents of thinking. Similarly, the resolution of attention is equally irreducible to the process of attention.
Furthermore, to deliberate is not to conclude:
No matter how much reasoning calls for a conclusion, another act is required, that is, a taking of a position with regard to the premisses.
Even if "choice issues from the last practical judgment... to make a judgment... is the work of freedom.Because the intellectualist position focuses upon the contents of deliberation, it tends to miss both the movement and the resolution of the act of attention.
At the opposite pole, the voluntaristic or existential reading of choice stresses the very aspect ignored by the rationalists, namely, the moment of resolution, the irruption of choice. Voluntarism tends to negate the guiding role of motivation and make the moment of choice everything.
Since this is the Sartrian position, we shall presently examine Ricoeur's critique of it.
Ricoeur concludes with a practical reconciliation of the theoretical discord between the two positions:
"We must say simultaneously that 'choice follows from the final practical judgment* and 'a practical judgment is final when choice irrupts'."62 Thus even after I arrive at the judgment "I must escape", it remains for this judgment to be taken up in action.
61 Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, P. 170 62 Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, P-181
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Sartre and Ricoeur Compared
A comparison of Sartre and Ricoeur on freedom will now be conducted in terms of (1) ontological freedom and negation, (2) freedom of choice and motivation, (3) freedom of execution and (4) methodology.
Ontological Freedom and Negation:
The root of most of the disagreements between our two authors stems from the fact that Sartre's phenomenology is governed by his ontological commitment, while Ricoeur brackets ontological considerations in favour of a stricter phenomenological approach.
Sartre's analysis of freedom at all levels is conditioned by his insistence upon conceiving of being on the model of the factual, the thing, and thus placing all being on the side of the in-itself.
He must then resort to "nothingness" as the ontological ground of freedom as the fluid, transparent, non-reified aspect of human existence which is consciousness.
"If being is the brute fact, the value which aerifies, so to speak, which introduces need-to-be into being, can only be lacuna and lack."°3 it follows then, that freedom is described as an all or nothing affair and choice must be described as totally creative not only of decisions but also of motives.
For Sartre, motives have no being until consciousness confers it upon them. This conclusion, while brilliantly supported is not convincing for it is predetermined by the logic implicit in a faulty ontology rather than by accurate phenomenological description of experience.
Ricoeur strongly disagrees not only with Sartre's ontology but also with his theory of motivation.
Sartre holds that nothingness as an ontological characteristic must be posited as the necessary condition for the possibility of all the "négatités" of experience such as interrogation, doubt, absence and refusal.
But he arrives at this paradoxical conclusion because he has placed all being on the side of the in-itself.
Coupled with the claim that there can be no passage, no mediation from being to nothingness, Sartre is forced to conceive of the for-itself as a nothingness:
"The being by which nothingness comes to the world, must be its own nothingness."64 Ricoeur, while agreeing that man is indeed in a dialectical tension between the positive act of existing and the negation which consists in man's finitude, argues against Sartre, that no negation can be conceived as originative of itself.
Negativity cannot be the basic characteristic of human existence.
Negativity must be grounded in a primal affirmation or "act of existing of which it may be equally said that it is without essence or that all its essence is to exist."65 Ricoeur rejects the Sartrian dilemma where being as static essence (the initself) confronts sheer nothingness (the for-itself) in favour of "seeing negativity itself as grounded in a primal act of existing which is both affirmative and prior to the negation which is finitude, but which is to be thought of as a dynamic act rather than as a fixed essence or form."6°R icoeur acknowledges that in the relation of decision to motives there is a negation, a power of refusing a motivation as Sartre suggests.
However, this negation, contrary to Sartre's view, is not an act which breaks with the totality of motivations, it is not "nothingness" which insinuates itself between decision and motive.
As Ricoeur explains:
"The relation of decision to motives is not a relation of rupture but one of support; it breaks here only because it takes support there; to decide is always to decide because of...
The idea of refusal is therefore not the key to this "nothing" which causes the insufficiency of motives."67
The most extreme case of refusal must be that of the radical conversion which according to Sartre involves a total repudiation of a past way of being in favour of a totally new original project.
Raskolnikov in Doestoevski's Crime and Punishment or St. Paul's sudden turnabout on the road to Damascus are understood to be examples of this.
64
Since an original choice is the source not the result of all reasons and all motives, Sartre must admit that an original project "furnishes us with no motive for making it past by means of a further choice."68 Yet Sartre must maintain the possibility of such an incredible "bootstrap" operation, because it is consistent with a consciousness conceived as a power of nihilation.
Ricoeur much more plausibly argues that there is no universal nihilation of the past self.
"A conversion is not a consciousness of severance; rather, I am aware of liberating in myself what remained inhibited, refused, impeded."69 jn conversion there is a negation of a previous negation of a primary affirmation.
There is always "an affirmation implicit in the most virulent negations of consciousness."'® Freedom of Choice and Motivation:
While Ricoeur emphasizes the importance of the moment of the irruption of choice whereby my project, my reasons and my self all become determinate he raises potent objections to a description of choice which fails to recognize that choice issues from a preceding process of hesitation, moves forward by a power of attention and involves both activity and receptivity before terminating in an act of resolution related to but distinct from a preparatory process. Thus Ricoeur*s basic criticism is that Sartre's description of choice is one-sided and incomplete:
Because Sartre exaggerates the act of resolution he (a) fails to acknowledge that choice involves both activity and receptivity, (b) misconstrues the purpose of deliberation, and, (c) wrongly denies the possibility of degrees of freedom.
Sartre's principal error is to identify choice with the act of resolution or the power of saying yes or no. This power is a kind of absolute which in itself admits of no degrees, but he extends this power and interprets it as also being a power of constituting motives and reasons.
He thus allows an essential dimension of choice, the freedom of the subject to affirm or negate, to distort the relationship between the act of choice and the whole of nature which is the relationship of motivation.
Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 5 6 8 .
Ricoeur, History and Truth, p. 322.
Ricoeur, History and T r u t h , p. 324. 
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At the moment of resolution or fiat something new occurs which is best described as determination with Ricoeur rather than creativity with Sartre.
In effect, for Sartre, the conflict of duties situation illustrates what is typical of all acts of choice conceived as creative and as beyond all determinants.
In the famous example of the young man having to choose between his duty to join the Free French Forces and his duty to remain with his ailing mother, Sartre argues that only an arbitrary resolve or fiat of the will can settle the matter.71 Whatever the young man decides to do (join the Forces, or look after his mother, or escape from both, etc.), his choice simultaneously creates a motive.
The act of choice is seen as a free floating act which, so to speak, leaps across a nothingness and in the process creates a target upon which a consciousness will settle.
The language of creativity underscores Sartre's view that choice is not receptive of its motives.
The absence of a receptive dimension is further confirmed by Sartre's conviction that deliberation is a sham-first comes the decision and it determines what shall count as a motive or reason. Deliberation is not a process which prepares a choice, it only announces the decision after the fact.72
Ricoeur recognizes that where confusion and conflict stymy the progress of deliberation intended to gradually narrow the range of alternatives, there is a call for resolute Sartrian style choice.
But even the case of conflict of duties is misrepresented by Sartre: though there is in such a case no logical connection between a selected motive and a choice, there is nevertheless a continuity with some motive, there is a receptivity and the act of resolution is not everything.
Resolve is indeed a necessary dimension of choice, that is, a leap of choice is required in varying degrees foç as limited beings our decisions are never so transparent to understanding that no risk is involved.
All our decisions are taken in media r e s , on the basis of limited time and knowledge in changing circumstances, in sum, in a context of hesitation.
If consciousness is to escape endless indecision, the personal initiative and invention of resolve is required.
So far Sartre is correct but his all or nothing stance on freedom leads him to exaggerate the 71 Sartre, J.P., Existentialism is a Humanism, tr.
Philip Mairet, London, Methuen, (19^8), p.p. 35-37. 7 2 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 581.
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initiative and inventiveness and to make deciding consciousness sovereign about the meaning of its existence. This leads him to negate the guiding role of motivation. This is a matter of no small consequence in that such a position logically leads Sartre to "annul attention to values as inauthentic, to submerge evaluation in decision, the receptivity of freedom in its activity and finally, the involuntary in the voluntary."73
In opposition, Ricoeur shows that the act of resolution does not annul the sustaining role of motivation.
For him, "the act of basing oneself upon...is the very essence of motivation."74
The motive is described by Ricoeur as the support or base of choice:
This metaphor of "support" contains two different notions which are precisely co-ordinated in the concept of motive:
The idea of a meaning and the idea of a force: a meaning inasmuch as the motive is a justification, a legitimization, a reason t£ or for ; a force to the extent that the motive initiates a movement, inclines or entails.
The connection of meaning and force is an essential one; there is no motive which is not to some degree a reason for..., thus a basis for value, and to some degree, an energy, a power, in the sense in which Aristotle said that "the will moves by desire."75
The double idea of a meaning and a force constitutes the originality of the relation of motivation.
A motive is neither a dead weight pressing upon decision for I decide the meaning of my motive; nor is it a simple subjective creation, for the world presents me with possibles which can be taken up as motives.
On this conception of motive, the decision of the young Frenchman may be described as one in which the novelty of resolve is prominent, but it also issues from a process of deliberation and is motivated.
The leap of choice is only Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, P. 175.
Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, P-l8o. one aspect having as its obverse side the emergence of a preference in the web of conflicting motives. "To choose an alternative is to prefer the reasons for this alternative to the reasons for another... This is why the debate is not in vain:
the chosen alternative has no value other than that which motivation brought to light."76
The one-sidedness of Sartre's position is now evident. Motives are not created by choice rather do they sustain choice.
And choice makes motives determinate. That is, at the moment of choice one of the possible projects is made categorical, the self is determined in what it shall be in its doing and finally the array of motives is fixed in a definite order.77
Sartre fails to see that while the subject's choice of itself in the world orients it to attend to the world in a certain way, the world presents already constituted pushes and pulls in the face of which will takes a stand.
The subject is free to accept or reject the motives which are presented to it but it does not constitute them.
It adopts or rejects the possible already there such that a possible only becomes a motive when the will bases itself on it. Motivation is both a passive and active relation.
Sartre seeks to transcend the Kantian antinomy of free causality and natural causality by denying that natural causality has any place whatsoever in the realm of human choice.
His conception of consciousness as nothingness is the ontological lever which he uses to cast natural causality out of the realm.
At the opposite pole, determinists opt for natural causality and deny freedom.
Ricoeur's principle of the primacy of conciliation over paradox does not allow him to opt for one or the other side of the antinomy.
Along with Plato, Ricoeur realizes "that natural cause is that 'without which* we could not act and that the motivational process is that 'through which* we act. "78 Ricoeur, Freedom and Mature, P. l8 0 .
Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, P. 172.
Q
Ricoeur in Strauss and Griffith, Phenomenology of Will and Action, p. 12.
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Freedom of Execution:
At the level of freedom of execution, both authors are in agreement-human action is limited by the self which is only human, by others who are also free and by the facticity of the natural world.
Ricoeur's description of freedom in terms of a reciprocity between the voluntary and involuntary at all the levels of human experience ranging from decision to bodily action to consent in the face of necessity accords well with our awareness of degrees of freedom. Ricoeur's phenomenological analysis makes understandable the limitations to action which we all experience.
By contrast, Sartre's phenomenological ontology leads to paradoxes. Ontological freedom and freedom of choice (as the ability to assign meanings) are described as inalienable and unlimited. Yet freedom of execution is constrained by facticity by the freedom of the other, etc. Suddenly, at this level, degrees of freedom are admitted but disguised as 'coefficients of adversity' or 'elements of situatedness' or the 'complexities of praxis' which CRD makes so obvious. It is only when Sartre speaks of action that he properly recognizes a reciprocity between the subject and the objective world. Had he acknowledged receptivity at the more abstract level of freedom of choice, much that is paradoxical in his philosophy would disappear.
Many of the divergencies between Sartrian and Ricoeurian conceptions of freedom have their sources in methodological factors.
Ricoeur's Critique of Sartrian Methodology:
One of Ricoeur's basic objections to existentialism applies fully to Sartre: Existentialism is naive in seeking direct description of man's prereflexive experience. It is clear that Sartre's basic method is, in principle, a descriptive one based on intuition of direct experience. The clearest examples abound in the section on bad faith and are sprinkled throughout his work including the part on choice. The naivetée is double: in the first place, existentialists do not sufficiently recognize that language is already at one remove from experience, in that it substitutes a signifying relation for a natural involvement. In the second place, existentialism practices a naive phenomenology insofar as it often fails to problematize the immediate and leaps too quickly to the ontological. ''Phenomenology becomes strict when the status of the appearing of things...becomes problematical...In this strict sense, the question of being, the ontological question, is excluded in advance from phenomenology, either provisionally or definitively."79 Ricoeur's numerous disagreements with Sartre on the proper description of choice all have their root in the phenomenological laxity and the ontological precipitation Sartre's practices.
Sartre proceeds from direct experience to ontological considerations about the being of man as free.
The subsequent analysis of choice is prejudiced by the need to preserve wholly intact, the original ontologioal thesis of absolute freedom against the encroachments of determinism and common sense views.
Hence choice is described as a totally creative upsurge of freedom.
To preserve the absoluteness of freedom the act of choice is deemed to be totally active and totally unreceptive:
Choice is not only beyond causes, motives, reasons, emotions, passions, but it is constitutive of them.
Ricoeur's eidetic description convincingly shows that this is not the case, that choice involves a reciprocity of the voluntary and the involuntary.
Sartre's zeal to preserve his ontological thesis leads him to distort even the directly available phenomena.
Ricoeur's description is more faithful to experience because he, in true phenomenological spirit, lets appear that which appears as it appears, rather than trying to fit the phenomena into a preconceived scheme of thought. The Sartrian argument about facticity amply demonstrates the validity of Ricoeur's criticism.
Ricoeur "holds that phenomenology always must be first a move away from immediacy"" ® or direct description. Ricoeur practices what he preaches when he applies eidetic brackets in FN and uses a reduced transcendental (Kantian) pattern in Fallible Man.
This conforms to his constant affirmation that indirectness must characterize any philosophic approach which seeks to be truly reflective:
"The order of philosophy is not a recapitulation of life, existence, or praxis, or ignore the achievements of objective thought. Instead, their conclusions and observations can and should be used diagnostically. These disciplines deal with the same being as phenomenologists do, namely, man. As such, it should not be surprising that they contain valid insights which might escape phenomenological methods and which can be used as clues for further research in the phenomenological context. The diagnostic relation is a process of uncovering intentional structures concealed in empirical explanations. It enables Ricoeur to use signs or clues in the search for subjective equivalents in the personal body. This is the reverse of the relation which enables a physician to move from the patient's subjective statement of "where it hurts" to scientific statements about physiology. Thus empirical observations and conclusions are employed to extend phenomenological investigations while avoiding the empirical attitudes and methods.
The determinists make their case by neglecting all those aspects of experience which do not fit into a physicalist mold of objectivistic thinking. Sartre makes his case by reinterpreting the data from a subjectivistic, ontological viewpoint. Ricoeur's great merit is that he has been able to provide a detailed and convincing description of human freedom while taking into account all of the data as it appears even those data which seem to contradict the basic thesis of freedom.
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